Piety as a form of self-knowledge
Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Telegraph Calcutta
In his foreword to Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein famously said: “This book is written to the glory of God, but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood.” Wittgenstein hesitated, not because of any philosophical commitment to the claim that the most important things were unsayable, or because an admission of this kind would expose him to embarrassment in a secular world. It was because amongst secular and religious people alike, it had become very difficult to imagine living a life that was devoid of what he thought was at the base of a properly religious attitude: a life free of vanity, and a life not judged by any instrumental purpose. Any profession of religion could itself be judged as an act of vanity, or in the service of some other value: to shore up one’s own authority, to stake a claim to truth, or to ground some other expectation. Why was it that Wittgenstein thought that the religious sensibility was the most difficult to possess? So much so that he declares: “Religion as madness is a madness springing from irreligiousness.”